Diego Armando Canales Martínez

Full-time Professor of Economics
Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Puebla

I am an economist specializing in political economy, game theory, and electoral competition. My research examines how institutional rules shape strategic behavior and, in turn, political and economic outcomes—especially when those rules govern who gets nominated, who can vote, and how collective decisions aggregate preferences into policy. I develop formal models to clarify the incentives faced by voters, candidates, and parties, and to identify the welfare trade-offs that arise from alternative institutional designs.

A central strand of my work studies electoral selection and policy formation through the lens of primary elections. In one of my core projects, I develop a sequential election model in which voters first nominate candidates in party primaries and then choose among nominees in the general election. The analysis characterizes subgame-perfect equilibria and highlights a design trade-off that is often missed in reform debates: open primaries can generate ideologically moderate outcomes yet distort incentives in ways that reduce productive efficiency in fiscal policy, while closed primaries can sustain efficient public goods provision at the cost of polarization. More broadly, this line of research connects nomination rules to downstream policy choices, showing how institutional details can jointly determine moderation, efficiency, and the quality of governance.

I received my PhD in Economics from the University of Nottingham. My agenda aims to contribute to the design and evaluation of democratic institutions by combining rigorous theory with clear, interpretable implications for reform discussions on voting and nomination systems.

Research Interests

• Political Economy
• Game Theory
• Electoral Competition
• Voting & Nomination Systems

Contact

Email: diego.canales@tec.mx
Escuela de Ciencias Sociales y Gobierno
Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Puebla